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Ciotti I - Better to Adjudicate than Litigate
Mike O'Hagan
I. INTRODUCTION
"The exclusive right of taking fish in all streams running
through or bordering said reservation is further secured to said
Indians; as also the right of taking fishes at all usual and ac-
customed places with citizens of the Territory..."'
When land was set aside for Indian reservations in the western United
States, "thought was rarely given to expressly reserving waters for use of
the tribes."2 However, necessity has created a substantial body of law that
expressly deals with the issue of Indian water rights. Indian water rights
reserve large, but for the most part unquantified, amounts of water through-
out the western United States.3
The Montana Supreme Court recently addressed the problem of un-
quantified Indian water rights as they relate to adjudication and state water
law in Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch (Ciotti II).' In
Ciotti II, the Confederated Tribes (the Tribes) of the Flathead Indian Reser-
vation (the Reservation) petitioned the court to accept original jurisdiction
and enjoin the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation
(DNRC) and its director, Bud Clinch, from issuing water use permits on the
Reservation until the Tribes' reserved water rights had been quantified.5 In
a six to one decision written by Justice Trieweiler,6 the court accepted origi-
nal jurisdiction and granted the relief requested.7 The Ciotti II decision was
the third time in fifteen years the court defined the pervasive nature of the
1. Treaty with the Flatheads, United States-Flathead; Kootenay - Upper Pend d'Oerilles Indians,
Jul. 16, 1855, 975, 796 (hearinafter the Treaty).
2. JOSEPH P. MAZUREK, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 187 (University Press of Colorado
1998).
3. FELX S. CoImN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 575 (Michie Bobbs-Merril 1982).
4. 992 P.2d 244 (Mont. 1999) [hereinafter Ciotti II].
5. Id. at 246.
6. Joining Justice Treiwieler were Justices Hunt, Nelson, Regnier. Three Justices did not partici-
pate in the decision. The Honorable Thomas M. McKittrick, Judge of the District Court, sat for Justice
Leaphart, The Honorable Jeffery M. Sherlock, Judge of the District Court, sat for Justice Gray, and The
Honorable Judge Roy C. Rodghiero sat for Justice Turnage. No reason is given in the opinion as to why
the three Justices did not participate in the decision. MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-803(2001), Disqualifica-
tion of judges, states that any [Supreme Court] justice must not sit or act in any action or proceeding:
1. To which he is a party or interested;
2. When he is related to either party or an attorney or member of a firm of attorneys of record for a party
by consanguinity or affiliation within the third degree, computed according to the rules of law;
3. When he has attorney or counsel in the action or proceeding for any party or when sitting on a case on
appeal he as a judge in the lower court rendered or made judgment, order, or decision appealed from.
7. Ciotti 11, 992 P.2d at 246.
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Tribes' reserved water rights.8
The dispositive issue in Ciotti II was whether the DNRC had statutory
authority under Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-311, to issue water use permits on
the Reservation prior to quantification of the Indian reserved water rights.'
Beyond the immediate issues and holdings in Ciotti II exists a history of
tension between the State of Montana, non-Indian fee holders on the Reser-
vation, and the Tribes.1° The court has played the role of an intermediary,
interpreting the federal and state law controlling the definition and adjudi-
cation of Indian reserved water rights. On one hand, the State has been
ostensibly trying to make the waters of the state, including those on the
Reservation, subject to appropriation for beneficial use by its citizens. On
the other hand, the court has been interpreting and applying the law to pre-
serve Tribal reserved water rights on the Reservation. As this note will
show, these two goals have been mutually exclusive.
Section II provides the legal framework for the creation of water rights
on the Reservation, for water rights doctrines and adjudication of Indian
reserved water rights. Section III addresses the procedural background of
the Ciotti II decision. Section IV discusses the court's reasoning behind the
Ciotti I decsion. Finally, Section V eyes the future of Indian reserved
water rights in Montana after Ciotti II.
1I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND EXISTING LAW
The Ciotti II decision is based on a substantial body of law developed
8. Prior decisions were In the Matter of the Application for Beneficial Water Use Permit Nos.
63023-76L, Ciotti; 64988-g76L, Sterner; and Application for Change of Appropriation Water Right No.
G15152-S76L, Pope, 923 P.2d 1073 (Mont. 1996) [hereinafter Ciotti I] and State ex rel. Greely v.
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d 754 (Mont. 1985) [here-
inafter Greely].
9. Ciotti 11, 992 P.2d at 246.
10. A non-exhaustive list of cases involving the Tribes, non-Indian fee owners, and the State in-
cludes: United States v. Mclntire, 101 F.2d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 1939) (The waters of Mud Creek were
impliedly reserved by the [Hellgate] treaty to the Indians. The United States became a trustee, holding
the legal title to the land and waters for the benefit of the Indians. Being reserved no title to the waters
could be acquired by anyone except as specified by Congress (citations omitted)); United States v.
Alexander, 131 F.2d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1942) (The reservation in question is situated in Montana and
was created by [the Hellgate] treaty in 1855. The treaty impliedly reserved all waters on the reservation
to the Indians. Being reserved, water rights could be obtained only as specified by Congress); The Big
Four v. Bisson, 314 P.2d 863-864 (1957)("By the creation of the reservation, title to the waters was
vested in the United States as trustee for the Indians." (citations omitted)); Joint Board of Control v.
United States and Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 832 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
486 U.S. 1007 (1988) (The Joint Board of Control of the Flathead, Mission and Jocko Irrigation Dis-
tricts brought suit to enjoin the Bureau of Indian Affairs from continuing to implement its 1986 operat-
ing strategy for the flathead Irrigation Project. The district court granted the preliminary injunction and
the Tribes appealed. The circuit court reversed the district court's grant of injunctive relief); and Greely,
Ciotti I, and Ciotti II discussed herein.
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over the past 150 years. The development of the doctrine of Indian reserved
water rights in the context of the Indian Reservation system is critical to
understanding Ciotti 11. The concept of reserved water rights was first ar-
ticulated by the United States Supreme Court in Winters v. United States in
1908 and reaffirmed in Arizona v. California.11 One author has written that
the "most succinct and lucid" explanation of reserved water rights was pro-
vided by the Court in Caeppert v. United States:
This Court has long held that when the Federal Government
withdraws its land from public domain and reserves it for a
federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves ap-
purtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to
accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In doing so the
United States acquires a reserved right in unappropriated
water which vests on the date of the reservation and is supe-
rior to the rights of future appropriators.
In determining if there is a federally reserved water right im-
plicit in a federal reservation of public land the issue is
whether the Government intended to preserve unappropriated
and thus available water. Intent is inferred if the previously
unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the pur-
pose for which the reservation was created.1
2
A. Creation of Reserved Water Rights on the Flathead Reservation
The Treaty with the Flatheads (the Treaty) created the Reservation
"[flor the exclusive use and benefit of said confederated tribes as an Indian
reservation."' 3 Within the external boundaries of the Reservation, the
Tribes were to enjoy:
"[T]he exclusive right of taking fish in all streams running
through or bordering the reservation is further secured to said
Indians; as also the right of taking fish at all usual and accus-
tomed places with citizens of the Territory, and of erecting
temporary buildings for curing; together with the privilege of
hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their horses
and cattle upon open an unclaimed land."' 4
Thus the Treaty, often called the Helgate Treaty, impliedly reserved all
waters on the Reservation to the Tribes.
15
11. COHEN, supra note 3 at 575 - 76 (citing 207 U.S. at 564 (1908); 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963)).
12. CoHEN, supra note 3 at 576 (citing 426 U.S. 128 (1976)).
13. Treaty with the Flatheads, 975.
14. Id.
15. United States v. Alexander, 131 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1942) (citing Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564, 577 (1908); United States v. Powers, 94 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 1938)).
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B. Water Rights Doctrines
1. The Doctrine of Prior Appropriation
The doctrine of prior appropriation was developed in the mining
camps of California in the 1850s, and eventually became the dominant
method of water allocation in the arid and semi-arid west. 6 Essentially,
rights are based on "first in time, first in right", so an appropriator's right is
first established when she puts the water to beneficial use. 7 The traditional
elements of a valid [prior] appropriation are:
1. Intent to apply water to a beneficial use;
2. An actual diversion of water from a natural source; and
3. Application of the water to a beneficial use within a rea-
sonable time. 8
Montana has adopted the doctrine of prior appropriation by statute.' 9
In Montana, a person may only appropriate water for a beneficial use.2" If
the appropriator does not use her right for a period of ten successive years
there is a prima facie presumption the appropriator has abandoned her
right.2 '
2. Indian Reserved Water Rights
The following discussion examines Indian reserved water rights in the
context of surface water and groundwater. Indian reserved water rights
cases primarily deal with the appropriation of surface water. However, sev-
eral cases have involved the issue of extending reserved water rights to
groundwater underlying Indian or federal reservations.22 Examination of
this issue is important because the dissent in Ciotti 11 argued the majority
decision extended the reserved water rights doctrine to groundwater.23
a. Surface Water Appropriation and Winters Rights
The development of Indian reserved water rights was first considered
16. DONALD J. PISANI, WATER, LAND & LAW IN THE WEST: THE LITrrs OF PUBLIC POLICY, 1850-
1924 24-26 (University of Kansas Press 1996).
17. WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 32 (Lewis Publishers, Inc. 2d ed. 1988).
18. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 74-75 (West Publishing Co. 1997).
19. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-401(1)(2001).
20. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(2)(2001). ("Beneficial use" unless otherwise provided
means: a use of water for the benefit of the appropriator, other persons, or the public, including but not
limited to agricultural (including stock water), domestic, fish and wildlife, industrial, irrigation, mining,
municipal, power, and recreational uses).
21. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-404 (2001).
22. E. Brendan Shane, Water Rights and Gila River III: The Winters Doctrine Goes Underground,
4 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 397, 402-404 (2001).
23. Ciotti II, 992 P.2d at 250-251.
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Winters v. United States.24 In Winters,
homesteaders built diversion works on the Milk River for irrigating their
land that adjoined the Fort Belknap Indian reservation in Montana.25 The
diversion works diverted water from the river channel, effectively depriving
the Indians of water for their irrigation projects.26 In response, the federal
government brought suit, on part of the Indians, against the homesteaders
alleging the stream diversion caused "[i]rreparabie injury of the United
States [and Indians], for which there is no adequate remedy at law."' 7 The
Court found that under the reservation system, the federal government's
policy to promote the transformation of tribal members to a "pastoral and
civilized people" would be defeated, and the land would become "practi-
cally valueless" unless the tribe's supply of irrigation water was protected
from the homesteaders.2 8 The Court held that even though the homestead-
ers had perfected their water rights under Montana law, the Indians had a
senior water right that was established as part of the Fort Belknap reserva-
tion.29
Consequently, water rights created as appurtenances to a reservation
are generally termed "Winters rights." In contrast to appropriative rights,
Indian reserved water rights are not forfeited if they are not used.3" Further,
Winters rights are consumptive. That is, water used to irrigate may not re-
turn to the stream from where it was diverted; instead the water may be lost
to evaporation, transpiration, or a groundwater aquifer.3"
In Arizona v. California, Winters rights were found to protect future
reservation uses, extending Indian reserved water rights beyond the present
needs of the Indians.32 The basic issue in Arizona was the share of water
each state was entitled to from the Colorado River.33 Collaterally, the
Court analyzed the amount of water from the Colorado River that would be
reserved on behalf of five Indian reservations in Arizona, California and
Nevada.34 The Court held that the irrigable acreage within each reservation
24. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
25. Id. at 567.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 576.
29. Id. at 577.
30. Andrew Nelson, Note 131, Ciotti: Preserving Federal Protection of Indian Reserved Water
Rights in Montana, 20 Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev. 131, 133 (1999) (citing Justice Steven's dissent
in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 574 (1983).)
31. MARc RESnER AND SARAH BATES, OVERTAPPED OASIS: REFORM OR REVOLUTION FOR NVEST-
ERN WATER 30 (Island Press 1990).
32. 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
33. Id. at 551.
34. Id. at 595-97.
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was the only equitable and feasible measure for reserved water rights.35
b. Surface Water Appropriation - Adair Rights
A second type of reserved water right was defined in United States v.
Adair.a In Adair, the Federal government filed suit in federal district court
seeking a declaration of water rights within the former area of the Klamath
Indian Reservation in Oregon.37 In 1976, the state of Oregon initiated pro-
ceedings under state law to adjudicate water rights in the Klamath Basin,
including that portion subject to the government's suit.38 Subsequently, the
state of Oregon and the Klamath Tribe intervened in the federal suit as a
plaintiffs.39 The Adair court found the Klamath Indians engagement in an
"aboriginal use of water to support a hunting and fishing lifestyle" estab-
lished a water right that predated the 1864 treaty creating the Klamath In-
dian Reservation.4" Therefore, their aboriginal water right had to be consid-
ered as part of the overall adjudication of the Klamath basin.41
"Adair rights" are derived from aboriginal hunting and fishing water
needs,4' and consist of "the right to prevent other appropriators from deplet-
ing the stream waters below a protected level in any area where the right
applies. 43 Unlike Winters rights, Adair rights are generally nonconsump-
tive, in that the water is immediately available for downstream appropria-
tors.
In summary, Indian reserved water rights have the following attributes:
1. The right are created without diversion or beneficial use;
2. The priority dates from the time of land withdrawal (here-
inafter formation of the Flathead Reservation) or the time
of aboriginal first use;
3. The right is not forfeited by nonuse; and
4. The right is limited to the amount of water reasonably nec-
essary to satisfy the purposes of the reservation.'
35. Id. at 600-02.
36. 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied Oregon v. United States, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
37. Id. at 1398-99.
38. Id. at 1399.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1397-98 (Citing the Treaty between the United States and the Klamath and Modoc Tribes
and Yashooskin Band of Snake Indians, October 14, 1864, 16 Stat. 707).
41. Id.
42. See MAZUREK, supra note 2 at 190.
43. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1411.
44. United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d 491, 494 (Colo. 1987) (citing the National Water Commission,
Water Policy for the Future: Final Report to the President and the Congress, at 464 (1973)).
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The "elusive nature"45 of Indian reserved water rights makes adjudica-
tion difficult as compared to appropriative rights, because the reserved
water rights frequently remain unquantified.
c. Application of the Reserved Water Rights Doctrine to
Groundwater
In the decades since Winters, Caeppert v. United States 46 is the clos-
est the Supreme Court has come to addressing the applicability of reserved
water rights to groundwater.47 In Caeppert, the defendant used pumps to
divert groundwater that was the source for a spring in Devil's Hole. Devil's
Hole was within a federal reserve withdrawn from the public domain and
made part of the Death Valley National Monument in 1952.48 As part of
the land withdrawal, the unappropriated waters in, on, under and appurte-
nant to Devil's Hole were withdrawn from private appropriation and re-
served to the extent necessary to provide a habitat for the preservation for
the endangered Devil's Hole pupfish (Cyprindon diabolis).49
The Court held that the defendant could not pump any more ground-
water, because scientific evidence established a hydrologic connection be-
tween groundwater and surface water at Devil's Hole.5 0 That is, the defen-
dant's pumping of groundwater caused a decline in spring's water level and
too great of a decline would threaten the pupfish. The Court held, since the
reserved water rights doctrine is based on the necessity of water to accom-
plish the purpose of a federal reservation, the United States can protect re-
served water from diversion, whether it is a diversion of surface water or
groundwater.5' The holding, which was based on the evidence showing a
hydrologic connection between the groundwater and surface water, was
limited to that amount of reserved water necessary to fulfill the purpose of
the reservation, no more.52
Lower courts have not been so reticent in addressing the applicability
of reserved water rights to groundwater. The question of whether federal
reserved water rights extend to groundwater was recently addressed in In re
the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys-
tem and Source." The Gila III litigation arose from comprehensive water
45. Ciotti I, 923 P.2d at 1079.
46. Caeppert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
47. See Shane, supra note 22 at 402.
48. Caeppert, 426 U.S. at 131.
49. Id. at 132.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 143.
52. Id. at 141 citing Arizona, 373 U.S. 546.
53. 989 P.2d 739 (1999); [Gila III].
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resource adjudication in Arizona that included Indian reserved water
rights.54 In Gila III, the Arizona Supreme Court reasoned that groundwater
and surface water are essentially a unitary, not a bifurcated resource. 
5
Consequently, the court held that the reserved water rights doctrine applies
not only to surface water but also to groundwater.56 However, the Gila III
court, limited the application by holding that, "a reserved right to ground-
water may only be found where other waters are inadequate to accomplish
the purpose of a reservation." '57
In Shamberger v. United States, the federal district court for Nevada
ruled that when the use of groundwater was necessary for a federal reserva-
tion to achieve its purpose, the federal government had an implied right to
groundwater, even though the legislation reserving the land made no men-
tion of groundwater.58 In Tweedy v. Texas Co., the federal district court for
Montana ruled that, even though Winters addressed surface water, the same
implications which led the Supreme Court to hold that surface water had
been reserved would apply to underground water as well. That is, if the
land was arid and water would make it more useful, whether the water was
found on the surface of the land or under it should make no difference.59 In
a somewhat similar ruling, ground water under the Gila River Reservation
was said to be impliedly reserved for the Indians. However, the [Plaintiff' s]
right to protection of groundwater resources extended only to groundwater
that could have been put to beneficial use on the Reservation.6"
In contrast, where litigation arose from a general adjudication concern-
ing several basins, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that Winters rights do
not extend to groundwater.61 However, the court acknowledged "[T]he
logic which supports a reservation of surface water to fulfill the purpose of
the reservation also supports reservation of groundwater."62 Thus, the ex-
tension of Winters rights to groundwater is not yet settled.
As the preceding cases generally show, in the context of federal reser-
vations, there is an implied reserved right for the groundwater. However,
the right is limited to that which is necessary to fulfill the purpose of the
54. Id .at 744.
55. Id. at 746.
56. Id. at 748.
57. Id.
58. 165 F.Supp 600 (D. Nev. 1958).
59. Tweedy v. Tex. Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968).
60. See Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 660, 700 (1986).
61. In re: The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753
P.2d 76, 100 (1988).
62. Id. at 99, citing Tweedy, 286 F. Supp. at 385.
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C. Adjudication of Indian Reserved Water Rights
Unquantified Indian reserved water rights create economic uncertainty
in a permit-based prior appropriation scheme. 64 Therefore, states generally
favor adjudication of all water rights, including inchoate reserved rights.65
However, with Indian tribes, uncertainty regarding the amount of reserved
water on a reservation is less of a concern. Instead, the tribes may perceive
adjudication as a limit on future economic development. 6
The McCarran Amendment gives states authority to exercise limited
jurisdiction by expressly permitting joinder of the federal government in
state suits involving the adjudication of water rights.6 7 Therefore, both fed-
eral and state courts may exercise jurisdiction over adjudication of Indian
reserved water rights.68 The underlying policy of the McCarran Amend-
ment is to encourage the determination of water rights between all the ap-
propriators on a stream or river, i.e. an inter sese adjudication of water
63. See Gila Ill, 989 P.2d at 747 ("In summary, the cases we have cited lead us to conclude that if
the United States implicitly intended when it established reservations, to reserve sufficient unappropri-
ated water to meet reservations' needs, it must have intended that reservation of water to come from
whatever particular sources each reservation had at hand. The significant question for the purpose of the
reserved rights doctrine is not whether the water runs above or below the ground but whether it is
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the reservation [emphasis added]").
64. Donald D. MacIntyre, Quantification of Indian Reserved Water Rights in Montana: State ex
reL Greely in the Footsteps of the San Carlos Apache Tribe, 8 Pub. Land & Resources L. Rev. 33, 35,
nl0 (1987).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 36.
67. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988). Suits for adjudication of water rights.
(a) Joinder of the United States as a defendant; costs. Consent is hereby given to join the United States
as a defendant in any suit:
(1) for the adjudication of rights to use the water of a river system or other source, or
(2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is
in the process of acquiring right by appropriation under state law, by purchase, by exchange, or
otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit.
The United States, when a party to such a suit, shall:
(1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the
United States is not amenable thereto by reason of it sovereignty, and
(2) shall be subject to the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may
obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances: Provided, that no judgment for cost shall be entered against the United States in any
such suit.
(b) Service of summons. Summons or other process in any such suit shall be served upon the Attorney
General or his designated representative.
(c) Joinder in suits involving use of interstate streams by State. Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued as authorizing the joinder of the United States in a suit or controversy in the Supreme Court of the
United States involving the right of states to the use of water of any interstate stream.
68. Nelson, supra note 30 at 134-35.
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rights.69 Such a basin-wide adjudication of all water appropriators is
thought to be more efficient and economic than a piecemeal adjudication
involving a limited number of appropriators.7 °
Federal courts have generally deferred to state determination of Indian
reserved water rights under the McCarran Amendment. In Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. United States, the Supreme Court extended
the McCarran Amendment waiver of federal sovereign immunity to state
court adjudications of Indian reserved water rights.7" In Colorado River,
the federal government, brought suit in federal district court under 28 U.S.C
§ 1345,72,73 seeking declaration of the government's rights to certain rivers
in Colorado.74 Several defendants filed a motion to dismiss the suit, alleg-
ing the district court was without jurisdiction to determine federal water
rights under the McCarran Amendment.75 The Court ruled the McCarran
Amendment effectively gives concurrent jurisdiction to federal and state
courts over controversies involving federal reserved water rights, including
determination of reserved rights held on behalf of Indians.7 6 The Court
reasoned the Amendment did not require the government to abdicate its
responsibility to defend Indian reserved water rights in state courtS.
77
Moreover, the Court said questions arising from conflicts of private water
rights and federal reserved water rights are federal questions, which, if pre-
served, can be reviewed by the Supreme Court after final judgment by the
Colorado court.78
The groundwork for Montana's adjudication of water under the Mc-
Carran Amendment was laid in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ari-
69. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976)[herein-
after Colorado River].
70. MacIntyre, supra note 64 at 41.
71. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820.
72. 28 U.S.C § 1345 (1988) ("United States as Plaintiff. Except as otherwise provided by Act of
Congress, the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings
commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act
of Congress.").
73. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1345, nl (West 1993 & Supp. 2001) (The McCarran amendment, as is clear
from its language and legislative history and from the fact that there is no irreconcilability in the opera-
tion of two statutes [43 U.S.C. § 666 and 28 U.S.C § 1345], did not divest the district courts of jurisdic-
tion over federal water rights litigation under this section giving the district courts "Except as otherwise
provided by Act of Congress" original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits, or proceedings commenced
by the United States.") (citing Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S.
800 (1976)).
74. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 805.
75. Id. at 806.
76. Id. at 811.
77. Id. at 812.
78. Id. at 813 (citing United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 526 (1971)).
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zona.79 In San Carlos, the Northern Cheyenne Tribe brought an action in
the federal district court for Montana, seeking an adjudication of its rights
in certain streams in the state."0 Soon after, the Federal government
brought two suits seeking determination of federal water and tribal water
rights, including the Northern Cheyenne's. Thereafter, all three of the ac-
tions were consolidated. 8 Simultaneously, the state of Montana was plan-
ning to begin comprehensive water adjudication under the Montana Water
Use Act, which established a judicial procedure for statewide comprehen-
sive water adjudication." The proceedings were stayed pending the Su-
preme Court's decision in Colorado River.
83
In 1979, the federal government brought four more suits to adjudicate
its rights and those of various Indian tribes.84 One month later Montana
amended its water adjudication procedures "to expedite and facilitate the
adjudication of existing water rights."8" The amended procedures recom-
mended that the Montana Supreme Court order all claimants (i.e. present
and potential appropriators), including the federal government, to file a
statement of claim with the DNRC by a date set by the court or be deemed
to have abandoned their water right.8 6 The federal government was served
with notice to file a claim when the court issued the order. In November of
1979, the federal district court dismissed the federal actions,87 reasoning it
would be wiser to follow Colorado River and defer the comprehensive ad-
judication to Montana.88
The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that Montana might lack juris-
diction to adjudicate Indian claims in state court.8 9 The Court of Appeals
based its conclusion on the Enabling Act under which Montana was admit-
ted to statehood, and the Montana Constitution promulgated in response to
the Act.90 Both the Act and the Montana Constitution provided, in identical
79. 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
80. Id. at 553.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 553-54.
83. Id. at 554.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing Act to Adjudicate Claims of Existing Water Rights in Montana, Ch. 697, § I(1),
1979 MONT. LAws 1901).
86. Id. (citing § 16, 1979 MONT. LAws 1906-1907, codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-212
(1981)).
87. Id. at 555.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 556 (citing Northern Cheyenne Tribe of Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation v. Adsit,
668 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Northern Cheyenne]).
90. Northern Cheyenne, 668 F.2d at 1085 (citing Enabling Act of Feb. 22, 1889, § 4, 25 Stat. 677
(North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington); Mont. Const., Ordinance No. 1 (1895).)
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terms, that Montana disclaimed control of all lands held by the Indian tribes
to the Congress of the United States." The court pointed out that Montana
may have acquired such jurisdiction under a 1953 Congressional Act,92 al-
lowing states with such disclaimers to remove any legal impediment to as-
sumption of certain aspects of civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian
affairs.93 The Court of Appeals held that "even if we were to find that
Montana had validly repealed the disclaimer language in its constitution,
... the limited factual circumstances of Colorado River prevent its applica-
tion to the Montana litigation."94
On certiorari, the Supreme Court decided the Montana case with two
similar cases from the state of Arizona. The Court ruled that, in light of the
McCarran Amendment, the Enabling Acts did not pose an obstacle to state
jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian water rights. 5 With regard to Montana
conducting a comprehensive adjudication of its water, the Court held that
because the underlying policy of the McCarran Amendment was to en-
courage state adjudication of water resources, the expertise and administra-
tive resources available to the states, and a judicial bias against piecemeal
adjudication and the convenience of the parties, the federal district court
was correct in deferring to the state proceedings.96 As will be discussed in
the next section, the holdings in San Carlos are significant for confirming
the framework for adjudicating Indian reserved water rights in Montana.
Although Colorado River and San Carlos fulfilled the purpose of the
McCarran Amendment, by allowing the states to adjudicate Indian reserved
water rights, the interests of states may be adversarial to those of the
tribes.97 From the perspective of Western states, undefined Indian reserved
water rights leaves great uncertainty regarding the amount of water availa-
ble for present and future uses; therefore, the states generally favor adjudi-
cation of water rights.98 On the other hand, to most Indian leaders, quantifi-
91. Arizona, 463 U.S. at 556-57.
92. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub.L. No.280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953)(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1360 (1968)("To confer jurisdiction on the States of California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and
Wisconsin, with respect to criminal offenses and civil causes of action committed or arising on Indian
reservations within such States, and for other purposes.").
93. Northern Cheyenne, 668 F.2d at 1087.
94. Id. at 1090 (In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied in part on (1) the infancy
of both the federal and state proceedings in the Montana litigation, (2) the possible inadequacy of the
state [adjudicatory] proceedings (which it did not discuss in great detail), and (3) the fact that the Indians
(who could not be joined involuntarily in the state proceedings) might not be adequately represented by
the United States in state courts in light of conflicts of interest between the Federal Government's
responsibilities as trustee and owner of its own water claims).
95. Arizona, 463 U.S. at 564.
96. Id. at 570.
97. Maclntyre, supra note 64, at 34-35.
98. Id.
cation means a limitation of water rights.9 9 Additionally, there is the poten-
tial for insufficient federal review in a state adjudication. However,
abridgement of Indian water rights can result in review of a "particularized
and exacting scrutiny" by the Supreme Court.' 0 Federal abstention from
proceedings to adjudicate Indian reserved water rights may also ignore the
Federal government's longstanding role of "of a guardian to his ward" to
the Indian tribes.10'
An alternative to federal abstention from the adjudication of Indian
reserved water rights was provided in Adair. In Adair, as discussed earlier,
the Federal government and the Klamath Indian Tribe sued the state of Ore-
gon in federal court for a declaration of water rights within former area of
the Klamath Indian Reservation. 2 The court did not abstain from the pro-
ceedings, as it could have done based on Colorado River and San Car-
los."°3 It declared water rights under federal law within the general bounda-
ries of the Reservation. It did not undertake a general stream adjudica-
tion," instead limiting its exercise of jurisdiction to applying federal
Indian law of reserved water rights.' 5 On review, the Ninth Circuit found
the district court coordinated its adjudication with the state court, allowing
each court to consider the matters most appropriate to its expertise.
106
This coordinated federal/state adjudication represents an alternative
that may be preferable to pure state adjudication. Under coordinated efforts
the federal government retains authority to exercise jurisdiction over federal
reserved water rights, including Indian reserved water rights.
As these cases indicate, there is a tension between preserving state's
rights and protecting Indian or federal interests when conducting a general
stream adjudication. In Adair, the decision to use a coordinated approach
was a factual determination that restricted the federal participation to water
rights created under federal law.0 7
I[. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ciotti II was a unique case because it was both a petition for exercise
99. Id. at 36 (citing Comment, The Adjudication of Indian Water Rights in State Courts, 19 U.S.F.
L. Rev. 27 (1984)).
100. Greely, 712 P.2d at 766.
101. The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
102. 723 F.2d at 1398-99.
103. Id. at 1405 n.8.
104. Id. at 1406.
105. Id. at 1407.
106. Id. at 1405.
107. Id.
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of original jurisdiction 0 8 and a request for supervisory control.' 0 9 It was
partly controlled by the Montana Supreme Court's precedent in Greely and
Ciotti L Ciotti II was also a direct response to Senate Bill 97 (hereinafter
the Permit Amendments), passed during the 1997 legislative session."
The legislative intent of the Permit Amendments was to negate the court's
holding in Ciotti L"' This section will discuss Greely, Ciotti I and the
Permit Amendments as precursors to Ciotti I.
A. Greely v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the
Flathead Reservation
Greely was a watershed case that defined Montana's authority to exer-
cise jurisdiction over Indian reserved water rights. On July 13, 1979, the
Montana Supreme Court ordered a statewide adjudication of water rights in
Montana.1 2  Several Montana Indian tribes argued the people of Montana
had not consented to the State adjudicating or controlling water on Indian
lands." 3 The State did not want to risk the resources to proceed with a
statewide adjudication of water rights that might ultimately be found defi-
108. Montanans for the Coal Trust v. State, 996 P.2d 856, 861 (Mont. 2000)(citing Butte Silver
Bow Local Gov't v. State, 768 P.2d 327, 329 (Mont. 1989) which determined that An assumption of
original jurisdiction is proper when:
"(1) constitutional issues of major statewide importance are involved;
(2) the case involves pure legal questions of statutory and constitutional construc-
tion; and
(3) urgency and emergency factors exist making the normal appeal process inade-
quate."
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to accept declaratory judgment proceedings "where the
issues have impact of major importance on a statewide basis, or upon a major segment of the State, and
where the purpose of the declaratory judgment proceedings will serve the office of a writ provided by
law... " (citations omitted)).
109. State of Montana, ex rel. Mike McGrath v. Montana Twenty-First Judicial District, 2001
Mont. Lexis 568 P 10 (2001) (citing Park v. Montana Sixth Judicial District, 961 P.2d 1267 (Supervi-
sory control is appropriate when a "district court is preceding based on a mistake of law which, if
uncorrected, would cause significant injustice, and where the remedy by appeal is inadequate")).
110. An Act Generally Revising the Water Laws to Clarify that the Department of Natural Re-
sources and Conservation May Issue Water Permits and Change Authorizations Prior to the Completion
of an Adjudication in a Source of Supply; Clarifying that Water Reserved Under State Law Is Not
Synonymous With Federal and Indian Reserved Water Rights Under Federal Law; Requiring a Water
Judge to Give Priority Over Other Adjudication Issues to Issues Certified to the District Court By the
Department; Allowing the Department to Negotiate Interim Agreements With Tribal Governments;
Amending Sections 85-2-101, 85-2-102, 85-2-217, 85-2-228, 85-301, 85-2-309, 85-2-311, 85-2-213, 85-
2-316, 85-2-321, 85-2-329, 85-2-331, 85-2-336, 85-2-340, 85-2-341, 85-2-342, 85-2-401, and 85-2-402,
MCA; and Providing an Immediate Effective Date and a Retroactive Applicability Date, 1997 Mont.
Laws, ch. 497, at 2789-2821. (hereinafter referred to as the Permit Amendments.)
I 11. Id. at 2800.
112. Greely, 712 P.2d at 757.
113. Id. At 758.
cient under Indian reserved water rights law.114 Consequently, on August
3, 1984, the State of Montana filed an application for writ of supervisory
control of the Montana Water Court." 5 The underlying dispute in Greely,
in conjunction with the San Carlos decision, opened two questions in Mon-
tana:
1) Was the Water Court of Montana prohibited from exer-
cising jurisdiction over Indian reserved water rights based
on the 1972 Montana Constitution?'
16
2) Was the Water Use Act" 7 adequate to adjudicate re-
served Indian water rights?" 8
The court answered both questions affirmatively, stating that although
the Water Use Act did not explicitly require the Water Court to apply fed-
eral law in adjudicating Indian reserved rights, state courts were required to
follow federal law with regards to those water rights." t 9 The court added a
rejoinder that, should the Water Court abridge Indian reserved water rights
by improperly applying the Act and/or federal law, the abridgement could
be appealed to either the Montana Supreme Court or the United States Su-
preme Court.120 Thus, Greely provided a constitutionally tested framework
for the adjudication of Indian reserved water rights in Montana using the
Montana Water Use Act.
B. Ciotti I
Ciotti I provided unmistakable direction to potential appropriators on
the Reservation. The court ultimately ruled that until the Tribes' reserved
water rights on the Reservation were quantified by a compact negotiation,
no new water appropriation permits could be issued. 12 ' Between October 5,
1984 and August 4, 1987, four non-tribal fee landowners filed various water
use permit applications with the Montana Department of Natural Resources
and Conservation (DNRC) to change or obtain new water rights from
sources on the Reservation.' 22 Prior to the passage of Senate Bill 97 in
114. MacIntyre, supra note 64, at 48.
115. Greely, 712 P.2d at 757.
116. Id at 758.
117. Mor. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-101-907 (1985).
118. Greely, 712 P.2d at 762 (The Act included Indian and Federal Water Rights - Water Rights
within Reservations, MoNr. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-701-708. According to the statute, it was the intent of
the legislature to conduct unified proceedings under authority granted by the McCarran Amendment, 43
U.S.C § 666 to conclude compacts between the state and Indian tribes claiming reserved water rights).
119. Id. at 765-66.
120. Id at 766.
121. Ciotti I, 923 P.2d at 1080.
122. Id at 1075.
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1997, the requirements for a water use permit required the DNRC to issue a
permit if the applicant proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
relevant criteria were met. 23 The Tribes argued that because they pos-
sessed senior unquantified reserved water rights, it was impossible for an
applicant to satisfy the statutory requirements for a water use permit on the
Reservation. The Tribes requested each of the applications be denied in
their entirety, maintaining the DNRC did not have authority to grant new
water use permits on the Reservation pursuant to the 311 Criteria. 2 4 The
DNRC consolidated the Tribes' objections, and on April 30, 1990, issued
an order concluding it had jurisdiction to issue water use permits, even
though the Tribes' reserved water rights had not been quantified.25 After
additional hearings, the DNRC affirmed its April 30, 1990, order.126
Following a complex path, the case was reviewed by the Montana Su-
preme Court.' 27 The court focused on the DNRC's authority to grant new
123. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311 (1995). Criteria for issuance of permit [hereinafter 311 Crite-
ria]; sections applicable to this note are:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (3) and (4), the department shall issue a permit if the applicant
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the following criteria are met:
(a) there are unappropriated waters in the source of supply at the proposed point of diversion: (B2 - the
"(a)" is here - I don't think section needs to be renumbered as you have done below)
(i) at times when the water can be put to use by the proposed applicant;
(ii) in the amount that the applicant seeks to appropriate; and
(iii) during the period in which the applicant seeks to appropriate, in the amount requested and that
is reasonably available
(a) the water rights of a prior appropriator will not be adversely affected;
(b) the proposed means of diversion, construction, and operation of the appropriation works
are adequate;
(c) the proposed use of the water is a beneficial use;
(d) the proposed use will not interfere unreasonably with other planned uses or developments
for which a permit has been issued or for which water has been reserved [emphasis ad-
ded];
(e) the applicant has a possessory interest, or the written consent of the person with the pos-
sessory interest, in the property where the water is to be put to beneficial use;
(f) the water quality of a prior appropriator will not be adversely affected;
(g) the proposed use will be substantially in accordance with the classification of water set for
the source of supply pursuant to 75-5-301(1); and
(h) the ability of a discharge permitholder to satisfy effluent limitations of a permit issued in
accordance with Title 75, chapter 5, part 4 will not be adversely affected.
124. Ciotti 1, 923 P.2d at 1078.
125. Id. at 1075.
126. Id.
127. Nelson, supra note 30, at 139 (On May 15, 1992 the Tribes filed a petition for judicial review
of the order in First Judicial District Court in Lewis and Clark County and a complaint for declaratory
and injunctive relief in the federal district court for Montana. The state court stayed any action pending
a federal decision. The federal court, however, ordered the action stayed until the state issues were
resolved. The federal court expressly held that the Tribes had properly reserved the federal claims for
later review. On January 12, 1995 the state court issued its decision affirming the DNRC's jurisdiction,
holding that the DNRC had jurisdiction pursuant to Montana's Water Use Act to issue new use permits
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water use permits on the Reservation prior to quantification of the Tribes'
water rights.'28 Justice Triewieler reasoned, that because Indian reserved
rights had yet to be quantified, it would be impossible for an applicant to
meet the burden imposed by the Montana Water Use Act. 29 That is, an
applicant could not show a proposed use would not interfere unreasonably
with an Indian reserved water right, until the Tribes' rights were quantified
either by a compact negotiation,130 or by a general inter sese water rights
adjudication.13 1 Therefore, the court held the DNRC did not have authority
to grant water use permits on the Reservation until a compact negotiation or
a general inter sese water rights adjudication was completed.
13 2
C. The Permit Amendments
In 1997 the Montana Legislature responded to Ciotti I by adopting the
Permit Amendments. The Permit Amendments requested by the DNRC,
were written specifically to negate the Ciotti I holding.' 33 The bill imposed
several major changes on the 311 Criteria. These changes included amend-
ing the language "unappropriated waters" to water "physically available"
and the addition of a "legal availability standard."' 134 In regard to reserved
water rights within the Flathead (and other) reservations was the removal of
subsection (e) from Mont. Code Ann. §85-2-311 (1995), which formed the
basis of the court's holding in Ciotti 1.131 Under the amended statute, appli-
prior to either a formal adjudication of existing rights or a completion of compact negotiations. The
Tribe then appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.)
128. Id. at 140-141.
129. Specifically, MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311 (e) (The proposed use will not interfere unreason-
ably with other planned uses or developments for which a permit has been issued or for which water has
been reserved.. .[emphasis added].)
130. Such a negotiation would be conducted pursuant MoNT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-702 (2001), Ne-
gotiations with Indian tribes.
131. Ciotti I, 923 P.2d at 1073.
132. Id. at 1080.
133. Montana Water Use Act, 1997 Mont. Laws, ch. 497 sec 7, § 311 at 2790. (From the State-
ment of Intent: The Legislature intends that the Montana Supreme Court's decision in In the Matter of
the Application for Beneficial Water Use Permit Nos. 63023-761, Ciotti; 64988-g761. Sterner; and
Application for Change of Appropriation Water Right No. G15152-$761, Pope, 53 St. Rep. 777 at 784,
923 P.2d 1073, be negated by the passage and approval of this bill. [A] statement of intent is desired for
this bill in order to provide guidance to the department [of Natural Resources and Conservation] under
85-2-311 concerning implementation and interpretation of the physical availability of water and reasona-
ble legal availability of water criteria. To find that water is available for the issuance of permit, the
department shall require a three-step analysis involving the following factors: identify physical water
availability, identify existing legal demands on the source of supply, and compare and analyze the
physical water supply at the proposed point of diversion with the existing legal demands on the source
of supply.)
134. See Ciotti 1 992 P.2d at 248.
135. See Ciotti 1 923 P.2d at 1080.
210 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW [Vol.23
cants for a water use permit were no longer required to show their proposed
use would not interfere with an existing reserved water right.'36 Applicants
were only required to demonstrate that there was water physically available
at the point of diversion and that use would not interfere with those of prior
appropriators. 137 Thus, the court's holding in Ciotti I and the Montana leg-
islature's "reactive end-run"' 38 of amending of the 311 Criteria set the stage
for Ciotti .
131
136. MoNr. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(1997). Applicable sections to this note are:
(1) A permit may be issued under this part prior to the adjudication of existing water rights in a source of
supply. In a permit proceeding under this part there is no presumption that an applicant for a permit
cannot meet the statutory criteria of this section prior to the adjudication of existing water rights pursu-
ant to this chapter. In making a determination under this section, the department may not alter the terms
and conditions of an existing water right or an issued certificate, permit, or state water reservation.
Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4), the department shall issue a permit if the applicant proves
by a preponderance of evidence that the following criteria are met:
(a) (i) there is water physically available at the proposed point of diversion in the amount that the
applicant seeks to appropriate; and
(ii) water can reasonably be considered legally available during the period in which the applicant
seeks to appropriate, in the amount requested, based on the records of the department and other
evidence provided to the department. Legal availability is determined using an analysis involving
the following factors:
(A) identification of physical water availability;
(B) identification of existing legal demands on the source of supply throughout the area of
potential impact by the proposed use; and
(C) analysis of the evidence on physical water availability and the existing legal demands,
including but not limited to a comparison of the physical water supply at the proposed point
of diversion with the existing legal demands on the supply of water.
(b) the water rights of a prior appropriator under an existing water right, a certificate, a permit, or a
state water reservation will not be adversely affected. In this subsection (1)(b), adverse effect must be
determined based on a consideration of an applicant's plan for the exercise of the permit that demon-
strates that the applicant's use of the water will be controlled so the water right of a prior appropriator
will be satisfied;
(c) the proposed means of diversion, construction, and operation of the appropriation works are ade-
quate; (d) the proposed use of water is a beneficial use; and
(e) the applicant has a possessory interest, or the written consent of the person with the possessory
interest, in the property where the water is to be put to beneficial use;
(f) the water quality of a prior appropriator will not be adversely affected;
(g) the proposed use will be substantially in accordance with the classification of water set for the
source of supply pursuant to 75-5-301(l); and
(h) the ability of a discharge permitholder to satisfy effluent limitations of a permit issued in accor-
dance with Title 75, chapter 5, part 4 will not be adversely affected.
137. Id. at (1)(a).
138. Nelson, supra note 30 at 142.
139. During the hearings on S.B. 97 Senator Dale Mahlum asked an attorney for the DNRC, "[i]f
this bill were to pass along the proposed amendments to it, if someone wanted to bring it to the Supreme
Court again, could they [the Montana Supreme Court] throw it out like they did the last one [Ciotti I]?
The attorney responded "[t]he intent of this bill is to put state law in the position that they cannot issue
the same decision they did before, and the anticipation is that it is going back up to the Supreme Court,
most likely with respect to groundwater, initially." Hearing on S.B. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on




Based on the Permit Amendments, on August 21, 1997, the DNRC
issued a notice of intent to issue new water use permits on the Reserva-
tion.140 On November 4, 1997, the Tribes filed an "Application for Exer-
cise of Original Jurisdiction, Writ of Supervisory Control or Other Appro-
priate Writ", naming DNRC Director Clinch and the DNRC as respon-
dents. 4 ' The Tribes petitioned the court to accept original jurisdiction and
enjoin the DNRC from issuing water use permits on the Reservation until
such time as the Tribes' water rights had been quantified.14
The court identified two issues for consideration:
A. Was it appropriate for the court to exercise original juris-
diction? and
B. Should the DNRC be enjoined from issuing further water
use permits on the Reservation until the Tribes' water
rights were quantified by compact negotiations 143 or by a
general inter sese water rights adjudication?
A. Original Jurisdiction
In its petition for original jurisdiction, the Tribes argued DNRC's in-
tent to issue new water use permits on the Reservation "ignore[d] the sound
guidance and ruling of the [Montana Supreme] Court in a most flagrant
manner, causing immediate and irreparable damage to the tribe."' 44 Fur-
ther, because the Permit Amendments allowed the DNRC to issue new
water use permits prior to the time the Tribes' water rights were quantified,
the Tribe argued that the case presented exigent circumstances of a state-
wide nature that justified the court's acceptance of original jurisdiction. 4 '
The DNRC contended the case was not appropriate for the exercise of
original jurisdiction because the factual record was inadequate to determine
whether the Tribes' rights had been affected.'46 The DNRC argued the trial
process would have been adequate for development of the factual and legal
140. Ciotti 11, 992 P.2d at 248-49.
141. Brief for the Petitioner, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, 992 P.2d 244
(Mont. 1999) (No. 97-609).
142. Ciotti H, 992 P.2dat 244.
143. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-702 (1995).
144. Application for the Exercise of Original Jurisdiction, Writ of Supervisory Control or other
Appropriate Writ for the Petitioner, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch at 4-5 (Mont.
1997) (No. 97-609).
145. Id.
146. Brief for the Respondent at 14, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, 992 P.2d
244 (Mont. 1999) (No. 97-609).
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issues presented by the Tribes' petition," 7 and still leave the court open to
hear the case on appeal. The court agreed with the Tribes, and exercised
original jurisdiction for the following reasons:
1. The petition raised constitutional issues;
2. Tribal water rights were of statewide importance;
3. The dispositive issue of the case was a purely legal or con-
stitutional issue; and
4. The normal litigation process was inadequate.1" 8
The DNRC argument was rejected because allowing the case to proceed
through the court system could take years.149 During that time, any number
of water use permits could be issued on the Reservation, despite the court's
holding in Ciotti L t1°
B. DNRC Injunction
In support of its petition, the Tribes maintained they possessed un-
quantified, pervasive Winters and Adair rights that carried a priority date
from at least the date of the Treaty.' 5 ' Because the nonconsumptive Adair
rights included the right to in-stream flow, the Tribes argued they had the
right to prevent other appropriators from depleting the stream's waters be-
low a protected level, which had not yet been determined.' 52 Further, they
reasoned Ciotti I precluded the DNRC from issuing water use permits on
the Reservation until reserved water rights had been quantified.'53 The
Tribes contended the Permit Amendment violated Article IX, Section 3(1)
of the 1972 Montana Constitution, which protected existing water rights,
including Indian reserved water rights.
154
In contrast, while acknowledging that the Montana Constitution pro-
tected existing water rights, including Indian reserved water rights, the
DNRC argued reserved water rights were not affected by the passage of the
Permit Amendments.' 55 According to the argument, Indian reserved water
147. See Ciotti H, 992 P.2d at 244.
148. Id. at 246-47.
149. Il at 247.
150. hd
151. Il at 249.
152. Id.
153. See Ciotti 1, 923 P.2d at 1080. (Reserved water rights would be quantified either on the terms
of MONT. CODE ANN. 85-2-311 (1)(e) (1995) or through a compact negotiations conducted under MONT.
CODE ANN. § 85-2-702.).
154. See Ciotti H, 992 P.2d at 249 (Article IX, Section 3 (1) of the Montana Constitution: All
existing rights to the use of any waters for any beneficial or useful purpose are hereby recognized.
(hereinafter Water Rights Article)).
155. See Ciotti H, 992 P.2d at 248.
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rights would be considered in the analysis conducted under the Permit
Amendments to determine if water was "legally available." '56 Further, the
DNRC argued it had the same statutory obligation to consider Indian re-
served water rights that it had prior to the passage of the Permit Amend-
ments.1 57 Contending that there were some uses of appropriated water that
would not affect Adair type water rights, it reasoned water use permits
could be issued without affecting Indian reserved rights prior to the rights
being quantified.158 Lastly, it maintained the new water use permits would
be "provisional" and would not cause injury to the Tribes' senior reserved
rights, because the permits were subject to revocation upon final adjudica-
tion of the Tribes' water rights.
159
The dispositive question was whether the Permit Amendments elimi-
nated the protection of Indian reserved water rights provided by the 311
Criteria. The Permit Amendments limited permits to legally available
water.160 "Legally available" was not statutorily defined, leaving it to the
DNRC to interpret its meaning. 61 However, the Permit Amendments' "ex-
isting water right" included federal non-Indian and Indian reserved water
rights created under federal law. 62 Thus, the 311 Criteria continued to re-
quire consideration of prior appropriators, which included Indian reserved
water rights created under federal law.' 63
In response to this confusion, the court conducted an analysis of statu-
tory construction, balancing the intent of the Permit Amendments against
the protection of the Water Rights Article, which protected existing water
rights whether the rights were adjudicated or unadjudicated.' 6 The court
concluded it was preferable to construe the 311 Criteria, as changed by the
Permit Amendments, in a manner that sustained their "constitutional valid-
156. Il at 248-49.
157. Id. at 249.
158. Id.
159. Brief for the Respondent at 7, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, 992 P2.d
244 (Mont. 1999) (No. 97-609).
160. Mor. CODE ANN. § 85-2-311(1)(a) (1997).
161. See Ciotti II, 992 P.2d at 250.
162. MoNr. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102 (8) (2001) ("Existing right" or "existing water right" means a
right to the use of water that would be protected under the law as it existed prior to July 1, 1973. The
term includes federal non-Indian and Indian reserved water rights created under federal law and water
rights created under state law.)
163. See Ciotti II, 992 P.2d at 248.
164. Id. at 250 ["Our effort to interpret "legal availability" is complicated in this case by two
competing rules of statutory construction. On the one hand, we are guided by the principle that "where
two constructions of a statute are possible, one of which would render the act unconstitutional, and the
sustain its validity, the latter interpretation must be adapted." (citing City of Phillipsburg v. Porter, 190
P.2d 676, 679 (1948). On the other hand, we are told that "in the construction of a statute, the intention
of the legislature must be pursued if possible." (citing Mont. Code Ann. § 1-2-102).]
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ity. '  Therefore, the court interpreted "legally available" to mean there
was water available which was not reserved for purposes of the reserva-
tion. 1 66 The court ruled that until the Tribes' reserved water rights were
quantified, the DNRC could not determine if there existed "legally availa-
ble" water for new water use permits on the Reservation. 167 Accordingly,
the court ordered the DRNC to refrain from issuing additional water use
permits on the Reservation until the Tribes' reserved water rights had been
quantified. 
168
C. Analysis of Ciotti 11
The court's decision in Ciotti II reaffirmed its holding in Ciotti I and
Greely. All three decisions are predicated on the necessity of the Tribes'
reserved water right being quantified before additional water use permits
are issued within the external boundaries of the Reservation. However, Ci-
otti 11 goes further than its predecessors and can be distinguished on three
points.
1. Further Defined Water Rights on the Reservation
Ciotti II is important because the court further defined the nature of
water rights on the Reservation:
"We conclude that is it preferable to construe § 85-2-311(1),
MCA in a manner which sustains its constitutional validity
and to do so requires that we interpret "legally available" to
mean there is water available which, among other things, has
not been federally reserved for the Indian tribes."'
169
In other words, on the Reservation, there are both Indian reserved water
rights and other water rights. As a result, until the Tribes' reserved water
rights are quantified, existing nonreserved rights cannot be quantified.
Non-Indian fee owners on the Reservation own significant irrigable acre-
age.17 ° If these landowners are found to have water rights junior to those of
the Tribe, it is claimed their land will be "severely" devalued. 7 ' Conse-





169. Ciotti 11, 992 P.2d at 250.
170. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Flathead Joint Board of Control at 4, Ciotti H (No. 97-609) (the
districts and their constituents and the Tribes compete for the same federal reserved water rights. Ap-
proximately half the District's constituents own 67,791.21 acres of land that was once allotted to a tribal
member under the 1904 Flathead Allotment Act, of April 23, 1904, 33 Stat. 302 or supplements thereto).
171. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Flathead Joint Board of Control, supra note 170, at 4.
CIOTTI 15
water rights must be conducted equitably. For example, non-Indian water
used to irrigate the holdings of non-Indian fee holders should be included
when the measure of the Winters rights is adjudicated. Unless this is done,
sufficient water may not be reserved for the irrigable acreage of the Reser-
vation.
2. Avoided Questioning the Constitutionality of the Permit
Amendments
The court's opinion was carefully crafted to avoid questioning the con-
stitutionality of the Permit Amendments. Instead the opinion focused on
the fact that the Water Rights Article protected Indian reserved water rights.
The court pointed out that existing water rights, which included federal
non-Indian and Indian reserved water rights created under federal law, were
constitutionally protected. 172 The court noted that the DNRC had acknowl-
edged this protection. 173 Although the court found it was clear the legisla-
ture intended the Permit Amendments to allow the DNRC to issue water
use permits prior to the quantification of the Tribes' reserved water rights,
use of the permits would possibly require use of water belonging to the
Tribes, and therefore would violate the Water Rights Article.174
Based on the court's holding, a proper interpretation requires viewing
the Permit Amendments through the lens of the Water Rights Article and
Mont. Code Ann. § 85-2-102(8)(defining an existing water right.)
171 Al-
though this approach leaves the Permit Amendments intact, it is not judi-
cially efficient or especially understandable.
Another approach might have been for the court to declare the Permit
Amendments unconstitutional in light of Ciotti I. In its brief, the Tribes
requested the court enter an order declaring the Permit Amendments unlaw-
ful, contending the enactment of the Permit Amendments violated the
Water Rights Article and prior court decisions.' 76 Instead, the court pre-
sumed the Permit Amendments were valid and construed them in a manner
passing constitutional scrutiny.
Regardless, both approaches appear to yield the same result - until the
Tribes' reserved water rights are quantified, the DNRC may not issue fur-
ther water use permits on the Flathead Reservation. However, the court's
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the Permit Amendments unconstitutional would have probably distracted
the Tribes and the DNRC from the necessary task of adjudication.
3. Judge Rodeghiero's Dissent
Judge Rodeghiero's dissent indicates his belief Ciotti II applies the
doctrine of reserved water rights to groundwater. Judge Rodeghiero wrote:
"The majority's holding apparently precludes DNRC from is-
suing permits for groundwater use in the fastest growing area
of the state even though uncertainty exists as to whether
groundwater is included within the [Indian] reserved water
rights doctrine." '177
Judge Rodeghiero's dissent is important because it points out that the poten-
tial economic and social fallout from the State and the Tribes' failure to
cooperate on the issue of water rights adjudication, including groundwater,
on the Reservation.
As discussed earlier in this note, some cases have extended Winters
rights to groundwater beneath a federal reservation, although the law is not
yet settled in this regard. A general limitation to the scope of Winters rights
in regard to groundwater is provided by Caeppert: "The implied-reserva-
tion-of-water doctrine reserves only the amount of water necessary to fulfill
the purpose of the reservation, no more."' 78 Gila III refines this limitation
with regard to groundwater: "[w]here other waters are inadequate to ac-
complish the purpose of a reservation." '179 Although the Ciotti II decision
does not say it, it is only rational to include groundwater resources within
the Reservation when quantifying Indian Reserved water rights.
Hydrologists and engineers have long recognized the interconnected
nature of surface and groundwater. 8 ° That is, surface water may seep into
groundwater aquifers, and groundwater may seep into streams and
springs.18' Such a relationship was recognized at Devil's Hole in Caeppert:
"[g]roundwater and surface water are physically interrelated as integral
parts of the hydrologic cycle."' 82 Additionally, optimum development of a
water resource system requires that both surface and groundwater sources
be studied, in isolation and as a complimentary surface/subsurface sys-
177. Ciotti 11, 992 P.2d at 251.
178. Caeppert, 426 U.S. at 141 (citing Arizona v. California, 463 U.S. at 600-01).
179. Gila II1, 989 P.2d at 748.
180. C.F. ToLMAN, GROUND WATER 35 (McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1937).
181. Id.
182. Caeppert, 426 U.S. at 142, [citing C. CORKER, GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND AD-
MINISTRATION, NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION LEGAL STUDY No. 6, p. xxiv (1971)].
CIOTTI I2
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However, whether a reserved right for groundwater exists depends
upon the purpose of the Reservation. To determine the purpose of a reser-
vation and the amount of water necessary to accomplish that purpose is
inevitably fact-intensive inquiry that must be made on a reservation-by-res-
ervation basis.'84 Winters rights, as discussed earlier, initially developed to
protect and support an agrarian lifestyle for Indians. Given the advent of
alternate reservation-based economic activities such as electronics,' 85 en-
ergy, 8 6 and gambling'87 since the Winters decision in 1908, a reservation's
"purpose" now must be broadly construed. Consequently, it would seem to
make sense that sufficient water, including groundwater and surface water,
be reserved for the Reservation to support a wide variety of activities, in-
cluding, but not limited to, agriculture.
In contrast to "the amount necessary" approach of Caeppert and Gila
III, the Tribes have proposed, as a starting point for negotiations, that "[A]ll
water on and under the Flathead Indian Reservation is owned by the United
States in trust for the [Confederated Salish and Kootenai] Tribes.' 88 Re-
gardless of the approach taken, groundwater must be considered in the adju-
dication of Reservation water resources.
The consequences of not adjudicating the groundwater resources of the
Flathead Reservation becomes apparent when considering the city of Poi-
son, located within the exterior boundaries of the Reservation. From 1990
to 1996 it experienced a 31.5% population increase.' 89 It has a projected
annual 3% population increase. 9 ' Potentially, Ciotti I prohibits Poison
183. DAVID F. MAImENT, HANDBOOK OF HYDROLoGy, §27.2.2 (McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1992).
184. Gila III, 989 P.2d at 748.
185. Dan Morse, Tribal Pursuit, WALL ST. J., March 27,2002, at R16 [But in a brutal year for the
electronics manufacturing industry - S&K Electronics (a printed-circuit-board and electronics manufac-
turing company established by the Salish -Kootenai governing council in 1984) had net income of
$119,272 on sales of $8.8 million according to their most recent filing with Dun & Bradstreet Credit
Reports]. B2 - Mike's note said he could not find this - I have included a hardcopy in the reference
book.
186. Robert Gavin, Inheriting the Wind: Indian Tribes Look to Tap Energy Source for Income;
Sweet Irony on History, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2001, at B1 (the Blackfeet, while furthest along in
developing wind power, are just one of more than a dozen economically depressed tribes hoping to take
advantage of the recent energy crisis).
187. Micah Morrison, El Dorado at Last: The Casino Boom, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2001, at Als
(Gambling sponsored by Indian Tribes has exploded from bingo games in the late 1970s to full-fledged
casinos owned by 196 legally designated "gaming tribes" and generating approximately $10 billion in
revenues last year [2000] - with approximately 175 more groups petitioning for tribal recognition and
casino rights).
188. (Letter from Matt to Tweeten of 6/13/2001, at 4).
189. Brief of the City of Polson at 3, Confederated Salish and Kootanai Tribes v. Clinch, 992 P.2d
244 (Mont. 1999) (No. 97-609).
190. Id.
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(and other Montana cities within the exterior boundaries of reservations
with unadjudicated water rights) from developing groundwater resources
until the Indian reserved water rights are quantified. At the same time, Pol-
son, as a water utility, is statutorily required to furnish water to all custom-
ers within its service area.19 Thus, Ciotti II may effectively prevent the
City of Polson from performing its statutory duty to supply water to its
customers, essentially acting as a de facto limitation on growth.
V. CONCLUSION
Overall the opinion in Ciotti II is well-balanced. The court avoided a
potentially inflammatory constitutional issue, while further defining the
scope of water rights on the reservation. Founded on the decisions in
Greely and Ciotti I, the decision lays out a clear road map for the Tribes
and the DNRC for adjudicating Indian reserved water rights on the Reserva-
tion.
Whereas the court's previous decisions in Greely and Ciotti I correctly
interpreted federal Indian water law and provided a framework for adjudica-
tion, Ciotti II forcefully tells the Tribes and the DNRC that it is time to get
to work on the important issue of water rights adjudication. One approach
could utilize Water Use Act as envisioned in Greely. This approach would
utilize the existing expertise of the Montana Water Court and administrative
resources available to the State. Further, litigation in San Carlos and
Greely has shown this approach to be constitutionally robust.19 Alterna-
tively, an approach similar to that in Adair could possibly be implemented,
with the Federal government limiting its exercise of jurisdiction to applying
federal Indian law of reserved water rights. 193 Additionally, the Tribes
have suggested a third approach, wherein all water including groundwater
and surface water be held on the Reservation by the United States in trust
for the Tribes.194
Lastly, the dissent in Ciotti II interprets the majority holding to extend
the doctrine of reserved water rights to groundwater beneath the Reserva-
tion. Given the interconnected nature of surface water and groundwater, it
would be prudent to quantify any potential need for groundwater underlying
the reservation. Additionally, given the changing face of reservation eco-
nomics, all water resources need to be considered for the future uses of the
Tribes.
In summary, the court's holding in Ciotti II clearly points to adjudica-
191. Id. at 4-5.
192. San Carlos, 426 U.S. at 564. Greely, 712 P.2d at 765-766.
193. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1407.
194. Letter from Matt to Tweeten of 6/13/2001, at 4.
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tion, rather than the litigation, of Indian reserved water rights. In 2001, the
adjudicative process was just beginning. 9 ' Initially, the Tribes have pro-
posed a Reservation-wide tribal administration ordinance, encompassing
both surface and groundwater. 196 In contrast, the State said it had no inten-
tion of giving up jurisdiction, instead it suggested creating a dual jurisdic-
tion, similar to other state-tribal water agreements.1 97 The adjudicative pro-
cess is expected to take several years.' 98 Whatever adjucative approach is
chosen, it must balance the competing interests of the Tribes and the non-
Indian fee holders on the Reservation.' 99
195. John Stromes, State Says It Won't Give Up Control of Flathead Water, IssouuLIA, February
8, 2002, at BI.
196. See FN 200 (Letter from Matt to Tweeten of 6/13/2001, at 3) (proposing that the focus of the
negotiations be development of a Reservation-wide Tribal administration ordinance which guarantees




199. John Stromes, County Asks State Not to Give Up Water Rights Control, MssouuLAN, Febru-
ary 7, 2002, at B1 [Lake County commissioners and Citizens of Lake County "overwhelmingly believe
that state jurisdiction of water rights appropriation must be maintained for fee (privately owned) proper-
ties."].
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